In September 2021, Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States announced the formation of the trilateral security pact known as AUKUS. As voiced by then-Secretary of Defense Llyod Austin, AUKUS was created to deepen information sharing and further integrate security, science, and supply chains. The secondary objective of AUKUS, enhanced interoperability and increased joint capabilities, was perceived as a good step towards the return of multilateralism under the Biden Administration — although it remains to be seen whether the Trump Administration will alter course. The key initiative, securing Australia’s nuclear power submarines, raises more concerns. By providing Australia with nuclear-powered submarines, the United States and the United Kingdom are circumventing long-standing international policy norms in the hopes of altering the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific and curbing Chinese expansion. The question, therefore, is this: Is AUKUS a nuclear pandora’s box?
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was first enacted in 1970 and has since been signed by 191 countries. The Treaty has two main components. First, the treaty is designed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. Second, the treaty is meant to encourage nuclear powers to share the necessary technologies to access civilian atomic energy use with non-nuclear states, therefore incentivizing non-nuclear states to abandon proliferation. The Treaty established a safeguard system in the form of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to ensure compliance through inspections of facilities. All non-nuclear weapon states (NWS) are required to declare their nuclear material to the IAEA, and the IAEA is tasked with ensuring that no material is being used for weapons manufacturing. While there have been setbacks and disappointments throughout the years, the IAEA remains an asset in international cooperation and nuclear security.
The AUKUS Loophole
For those already familiar with the NPT, it may seem puzzling where the controversy resides. After all, the NPT does not specifically prohibit the use of nuclear-powered ships by non-NWS, nor does it prevent non-NWS from building such ships. The members of AUKUS have preemptively launched informational campaigns to defend the submarine deal, hoping to quell any concerns that may permeate the debates and discussions. However, as part of the safeguard system put in place, the IAEA is responsible for safeguarding nuclear reactors, an action which cannot be taken on submarines whose position must remain classified for national security. In response to this, for “non-proscribed military activity,” the IAEA guidelines allow for non-NWS to remove nuclear materials. A technical loophole exists for non-NWS to remove nuclear materials from safeguards without oversight from the international bodies tasked with the responsibility.
Precedent
James M. Acton, co-director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, has stated the concern is not that Australia has a desire to proliferate nuclear material, but rather the precedent that AUKUS will set is one of disregard for international norms. Other nations may see that the international community, if not outright condones, at least tolerates non-NWS withdrawing nuclear materials to undisclosed locations. Putting aside the risks of more nefarious states taking advantage of this loophole, AUKUS has serious implications to the United States’ relationships with key allies. France views AUKUS as a stab in the back by its allies due to the perceived critical nature of the Indo-Pacific within their foreign policy apparatus. Similarly, France had an agreement with Australia in place to purchase submarines using the French naval industry, which Australia backed out of after AUKUS was announced.
The international order relies on rogue actors knowing or fearing that the international community will condemn their actions and isolate them from the global community. If the international community is silent in the face of AUKUS breaking norms, it will embolden other actors with less respect for others’ sovereignty to take similar actions. Australia will be the first non-NWS to acquire nuclear-powered submarines. Past attempts by other nations have been met with hostility, even by the United States. In 1987, Canada was close to acquiring nuclear-powered submarines until the United States interfered, saying it was “unnecessary and even unwelcome.”
Allies and Adversaries: The Carrot and the Stick
Under the NPT, only five states are considered to be NWS. They are the United States, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, the French Republic, and the People’s Republic of China. The ability of the United States, France, and the U.K., known as the P3, to limit the spread of nuclear weapons to allied states is strong. They have many tools at their disposal, such as offering security guarantees and economic incentives. This is evident by the nuclear umbrella the United States provides to members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Republic of Korea, and Japan. It’s further amplified by the Seventh Fleet in the Pacific, which periodically uses nuclear-powered attack submarines as a show of force. The ability of the United States to limit the spread to non-allied countries is significantly weaker. Naturally, the United States does not offer security guarantees to its adversaries, and economic sanctions, while at times successful, are often mitigated by other actors providing economic relief. Such relief is illustrated by China’s foreign aid to North Korea, and China’s continuous support to Russia enabling them to circumvent the international sanctions placed after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
Justified or not, the United States has gained a reputation as a regime changer. Whether in Iraq with Saddam Hussein or Libya with Muammar Gaddafi, both leaders gave up nuclear weapons, and both were ousted from power. The lesson to states such as Iran and North Korea was to develop nuclear capabilities to preserve their regimes. These unintentional lessons have not only led to the buildup of their nuclear arsenals, but have increased regional tensions. Providing nuclear submarines to a Pacific ally, even if the reason is benign, is unlikely to reassure leaders in Pyongyang and Beijing that confrontation is not on the horizon.
Global Reactions
Reactions from around the region have been mixed. China and North Korea have both claimed that AUKUS undermines regional stability, and both Malaysia and Indonesia warned of an escalating arms race. Meanwhile the Philippines and Japan both welcomed the announcement as a necessary engagement. South Korea struck a more muted tone, perhaps reflecting the concern of nations on the frontlines of future conflicts, or a lingering grudge from when the United States declined to supply South Korea with nuclear fuel in 2020 to build their own ships.
Conclusion
AUKUS provides many benefits to the United States and its interests. It strengthens trilateral relations between nations that are already inseparable, and it represents a strategic re-engagement in a region that is likely to become the focus of a great power tug-of-war. From the perspective of Australia, it is seen as the next step towards countering Chinese advancements and a necessary action to protect its interests in the Indo-Pacific region. While parties to AUKUS have already released plans for engaging with the IAEA to reconcile any concerns, this requires close monitoring as the process continues. AUKUS is likely to prove to be a success in the long term, but they must proceed cautiously. The United States and her allies should not create one crisis in an attempt to tackle another: the rise of China as a global superpower.
Author: Jonah Gold is a contributor to the International Law and Policy Brief (ILPB), and a J.D. candidate at The George Washington University Law School. He has a Bachelor’s Degree in Philosophy with a focus in Public Policy from The George Washington University.
Editors: Tris Sebesta and Punam Chopra