The case of Lackey v. Stinnie, argued on October 8, may not have attracted national headlines, but its implications for civil rights litigation are profound. At the heart of this case is the question of whether plaintiffs in civil rights cases can recover attorney’s fees after securing preliminary injunctions. This issue, though technical, is fundamental to ensuring access to justice for marginalized groups.
To explore the case, it’s essential to understand the statute at its core: 42 U.S.C. § 1988, the federal law that allows courts to award reasonable attorney’s fees to the prevailing party in certain civil rights cases. This law is critical because it enables victims of discrimination, often without the means to pay for legal representation, to bring lawsuits to enforce their civil rights.
This article will delve into the details of Lackey, the significance of § 1988, the legal debate surrounding “prevailing party” status, and the significance of this case for future civil rights litigation.
Understanding 42 U.S.C. § 1988
At the core of Lackey is the interpretation of 42 U.S.C. § 1988, which allows courts to award attorney’s fees to the “prevailing party” in certain civil rights cases. As Pooja Chaudhuri from the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law explains it, § 1988 is intended to help ensure that victims of discrimination, who often cannot afford legal representation, have access to justice.
In simple terms, the law serves two key functions:
- Access to Legal Representation: Many civil rights plaintiffs are low-income individuals or members of marginalized communities. Without the possibility of recovering attorney’s fees, they would likely struggle to find attorneys willing to represent them. This would make it nearly impossible for many to seek justice for violations of their rights.
- Deterrence: By making defendants liable for attorney’s fees, Congress aimed to discourage state actors and other entities from violating civil rights laws in the first place. Knowing that a successful lawsuit could result in hefty legal fees, potential violators may be less likely to engage in discriminatory practices.
The Factual Background of Lackey
Lackey originated in Virginia, where state law mandated the suspension of driver’s licenses for individuals who failed to pay court debts. This law disproportionately affected low-income individuals, trapping them in a cycle of poverty. Without the ability to drive, many were unable to work, making it even more difficult to pay off their debts.
The plaintiffs in this case, represented by the Legal Aid Justice Center of Virginia, were indigent individuals who could not pay their court debts. As a result, their driver’s licenses were suspended, further hindering their ability to find employment and support their families. These plaintiffs sought legal relief, arguing that the law violated their civil rights.
In a significant victory for the plaintiffs, a federal court issued a preliminary injunction, temporarily preventing Virginia from enforcing the law. Soon after, the Virginia legislature repealed the statute, effectively conceding the plaintiffs’ victory. However, the Legal Aid Justice Center then sought attorney’s fees under § 1988, arguing that they were the “prevailing party” in the case.
This set the stage for the current dispute: whether plaintiffs who secure preliminary injunctions—but do not go through a full trial—are entitled to attorney’s fees under § 1988.
Virginia’s Argument: No “Prevailing Party” Status
Virginia, joined by other state and federal actors, argues that the plaintiffs should not be considered the “prevailing party” because they only won a preliminary injunction, not a final judgment. According to Virginia, a preliminary injunction, by definition, is temporary, and does not constitute a lasting change in the legal relationship between the parties. They cite the Supreme Court’s decision in Sole v. Wyner, 551 U.S. 74 (2007), where the Court ruled that a plaintiff who won a preliminary injunction but lost the case on the merits was not entitled to attorney’s fees.
Virginia’s central claim is that the plaintiffs’ victory was not final—it was merely preliminary—and that awarding attorney’s fees for such victories would be both legally and practically problematic. The state warns that allowing plaintiffs to claim attorney’s fees for preliminary injunctions could create a chilling effect, discouraging states from voluntarily repealing bad laws for fear of incurring large legal fees.
Plaintiffs’ Counterargument: Preliminary Injunctions Can Be a Final Victory
The plaintiffs argue that in many civil rights cases, a preliminary injunction is effectively the final victory. In cases where the law is repealed or amended after a preliminary injunction, there is often no need for a full trial because the plaintiffs have already achieved their objective.
Chaudhuri explains that many civil rights cases never go to trial. Sometimes, the mere issuance of a preliminary injunction is enough to stop the discriminatory practice, and the defendants subsequently change their policies. In these cases, the plaintiffs have clearly won, even if they did not go through the full litigation process. Thus, they argue, plaintiffs who secure a preliminary injunction that results in a change to the legal relationship between the parties should be entitled to attorney’s fees under § 1988.
Additionally, the plaintiffs argue that denying attorney’s fees in such cases would undermine the purpose of § 1988 by discouraging attorneys from taking on civil rights cases. Public interest attorneys rely on the possibility of recovering attorney’s fees to sustain their work. Without this financial incentive, fewer attorneys would be able to represent civil rights plaintiffs, many of whom cannot afford to pay legal fees upfront.
The Broader Legal Context
The Supreme Court’s decision in Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598 (2001) is central to this case. There, the Court held that to qualify as a “prevailing party” under § 1988, a plaintiff must secure judicial imprimatur, meaning an order that changes the legal relationship between the parties. The plaintiffs in Lackey argue that the preliminary injunction they secured meets this standard because it temporarily prevented Virginia from enforcing its discriminatory law, and the subsequent repeal of the law cemented their victory.
Virginia, however, insists that a preliminary injunction is not enough—it is a temporary measure, and only a final judgment on the merits should trigger attorney’s fees.
The courts of appeals have approached this issue differently. While some circuits have been more lenient in allowing attorney’s fees for preliminary injunctions, others have been stricter, requiring a final judgment. However, as Chaudhuri points out, the idea of a true “circuit split” on this issue may be overstated. Most courts agree that a preliminary injunction can sometimes be enough to trigger attorney’s fees, as long as it changes the legal relationship between the parties and is not later overturned.
The Stakes of Lackey
At stake in Lackey is not just the question of attorney’s fees in this particular case but the broader ability of civil rights plaintiffs to seek justice. If the Supreme Court sides with Virginia and rules that preliminary injunctions do not qualify for attorney’s fees, it could significantly diminish the financial viability of many civil rights lawsuits.
Civil rights cases are often brought by low-income plaintiffs who cannot afford to pay attorney’s fees upfront. Without the prospect of recovering fees, many attorneys might be unable to take on these cases, leaving significant civil rights violations unchallenged. Furthermore, if states know they can avoid paying attorney’s fees simply by repealing laws after losing preliminary injunctions, they may be less likely to settle or resolve cases early, leading to prolonged litigation and unnecessary legal costs.
On the other hand, if the Court rules in favor of the plaintiffs, it would reinforce the importance of preliminary injunctions as a tool for achieving justice in civil rights cases. By allowing plaintiffs to recover attorney’s fees after securing preliminary injunctions, the Court would ensure that civil rights attorneys can continue to take on these critical cases, even when the plaintiffs themselves cannot afford to pay.
Conclusion
The outcome of Lackey will have far-reaching consequences for civil rights litigation in the United States. At its core, the case is about ensuring that victims of discrimination can access the legal representation they need to challenge unjust laws and practices. By deciding whether preliminary injunctions qualify plaintiffs for attorney’s fees, the Supreme Court will either strengthen or weaken one of the most important tools for enforcing civil rights protections.
The ideologically diverse and unique groups that have joined forces to support the plaintiffs as amici, including the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the Firearms Policy Coalition (FPC), directly speaks to the broad, bipartisan support for the financial viability of future civil rights lawsuits.
Whatever the Court decides, Lackey will likely shape the economic future of civil rights litigation for years to come.
